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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
AGENCY
Milton M. Harrison*
Two cases provided the opporunity for the court to reiterate
the well-established doctrine that failure of a principal to re-
pudiate immediately an unauthorized agreement by an agent
when notified of such agreement amounts to ratification of the
agreement by the principal.
In Gallioto v. Trapani,' a real estate broker2 transferred to
the prospective vendor a portion of the deposit made to him at
the time of the execution of an agreement to sell a business
establishment. Although there was no evidence of specific au-
thority to make such a transfer, it was made in the presence of
the vendee without any protest or repudiation and the vendee
took possession of the premises. The sale was not consummated
because of foreclosure by creditors of the owner. The court held
that the principal (vendee) had ratified the agent's act in trans-
ferring a portion of the deposit and could therefore recover only
the remainder.
In Bellestri v. Clark3 the court said it was of no import
whether one held out to be an agent acted with actual authority
where he acted in the presence of the purported principal who
expressed no disagreement.
The court in neither case referred to Civil Code Article 3021,
but it is clear that ratification may result from silence and in-
action as well as be expressed in positive terms.
MINERAL RIGHTS*
Harriet S. Daggett**
The case of Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse' was
a concursus proceeding instituted to obtain a determination of
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 238 La. 625, 116 So.2d 273 (1959).
2. The court also cited with approval Succession of Gilmore, 154 La. 105, 97
So. 330 (1.923), and the interpretation of Civil Code Articles 3016 and 3017, to
the effect that a real estate broker, whose purpose is to bring together vendor
and vendee, is the agent of both parties, owing equal fidelity to each.
3. 239 La. 713, 119 So.2d 836 (1960).
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend Jack
P. Brook for his work in the preparation of these materials.
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 238 La. 1013, 117 So.2d 575 (1960).
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the ownership of royalty interests in a 150-acre tract of land.
The court divided the claimants into a "first group" who claimed
interests from royalty deeds dated prior to 1944 and a "second
group," whose title emanated from royalty interests acquired
subsequent to 1944. The landowner executed a mineral lease in
1948 and, in 1952, agreed to a unitization plan which included
24 acres of the disputed tract in a production unit. Later in 1952
a producing well was completed within the unit but not on the
24-acre portion. The validity of the conflicting claims of royalty
ownership depended upon whether this production interrupted
prescription liberandi causa on the entire 150-acre tract. The
court, in holding that prescription on the entire tract was inter-
rupted, distinguished the case of Elson v. Mathewes.2 In the
Elson case it was held that a mineral servitude was capable of
division by a contract between the landowner and the servitude
owner. In the instant case it was stated that the same rules of
liberative prescription governed both servitudes and royalties.
But, contrary to Elson, the court here found no intention to di-
vide the acreage involved into separate tracts. The Elson case
was further distinguished on the basis that the pooling agree-
ment in Elson was made by the landowner, royalty owners, and
lessees, while the agreement in this case was between the lessees
and the royalty owners (whether or not they were landowners).
The majority opinion stated that a bi-party agreement between
lessees and royalty owners could hardly be an agreement between
the landowners and the royalty owners to divide the tract into
two segments.
Justice Hawthorne, in dissent,3 argued that the instant case
should be controlled by the Elson decision. He stated that, in
Elson, the court had found an intention to divide the servitude
because the unitization agreement had not included any pro-
vision relating to the land not included in the unit and no drill-
ing on the non-unitized portion had been attempted. The dissent
correctly points out that the same factors existed in the instant
case. Justice Hawthorne was also disturbed by the possibility
that mineral lessees may hold large tracts of land, immune from
the operation of liberative prescription, merely by including a
small part of the leased acreage in a producing unit.
2. 224 La. 417, 69 So.2d 734 (1957).
3. Justice Hamiter also dissented but did not assign written reasons.
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In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clement,4 the landowner had sold an in-
terest in the minerals in a certain tract of land containing 106
acres. The deed recited that the vendee acquired a one-fourth
interest in all the minerals to be produced on 76 acres of the
tract and in addition, a one-fourth interest in all minerals pro-
duced below 2200 feet under the south 30 acres. There was drill-
ing activity on the north 76 acres which was sufficient to inter-
rupt prescription but none on the 36-acre tract. In a concursus
proceeding provoked by Gulf Oil Corporation, the heirs of the
vendor claimed that the deed established two servitudes, one on
the 76 acres and one on the south 30 acres, and that the drilling
on the 76 acres did not interrupt prescription on the smaller
tract. In refusing to adopt these contentions, the court said that
the reservation did not affect the nature of the interest granted
and amounted to nothing more than an agreement that the
vendor would receive all royalties from production on the south
30 acres above 2200 feet.5
The case of Tinsley v. Seismic Explorations, Inc.,6 presented
the question of whether the lessee of mineral lands was entitled
to recover damages from a seismic survey on the leased prem-
ises. The lessee had been approached by agents of several ex-
ploration companies other than defendant, who had unsuccess-
fully tried to obtain permission to conduct such surveys. After
obtaining permission from the lessor, but without consulting the
lessee, defendant conducted the tests.
In refusing to allow an award of damages, the court reviewed
the jurisprudence and the legislative changes concerning Act 205
of 1938 and concluded that a lessee is not the owner of a real
right and therefore unable to bring "an action in tort for tres-
pass and to recover damages. '" 7 It was concluded, however, that
the lessee could recover by proving three essential elements:
(1) that he owned an exclusive right to conduct geophysical
surveys; (2) that this right has been protected by timely rec-
ordation; and (3) that actual damages could be established.
Without deciding (1) or (2), it was held that plaintiff was not
entitled to recover because he had failed to establish any actual
damage. "In essence, the award of the district court, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeal, amounts to the infliction of
4. 239 La. 144, 118 So.2d 361 (1960).
5. 239 La. 144, 150, 118 So.2d 361, 363 (1960).
6. 239 La. 23, 117 So.2d 897 (1960).
7. 239 La. 23, 28, 117 So.2d 897, 898 (1960).
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punitive or exemplary damages which are not recoverable under
our law, nor can we countenance an award based on arbitrary
measures."
Gueno v. Medlenka9 presented a situation which required the
decision whether the naked owner or the usufructuary of certain
land was the proper party to execute a mineral lease on the land.
At the time of the creation of the usufruct, there was neither
an existing lease nor production on the land. The court reaf-
firmed the prior decisions that exploration for oil and gas was
"mining" within the meaning of our law and stated that Civil
Code Article 552 was applicable to the instant case. This article
provides that: "The usufructuary has a right to the enjoyment
and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject to the
usufruct, if they were actually worked before the commence-
ment of the usufruct; but he has no right to mines and quarries
not opened."'10 Accordingly, it was concluded that the naked
owner, not the usufructuary, was the proper party to execute a
valid lease and share in the proceeds of production. Primarily
on the basis of the public policy against holding property out of
commerce, the court further decided that the right of the naked
owner (or his lessee) to explore for and produce minerals, is not
subordinate to the rights of the usufructuary. The court implied
that the usufructuary's right to enjoyment of the property free
from interference could be protected adequately by an action for
damages against the owner or his lessee.'
The Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co.'2 case arose from an
involved factual situation. In 1931, Long-Bell Lumber Sales
Corporation conveyed the minerals under a vast tract of land
in Beauregard Parish to Long-Bell Minerals Corporation, thus
creating a mineral servitude. Long-Bell Petroleum Company,
defendant in the instant case, became the owner of this servi-
tude by virtue of a merger of the minerals corporation with the
petroleum company in 1936. Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation
acquired the title to the land from the lumber sales corporation
some time prior to 1938. In 1938, the farm land corporation
8. 239 La. 23, 41, 117 So.2d 897, 903 (1960).
9. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960). See Note, 20 LOUISIANA LAWv RtvIEw
773 (1960).
10. LA. CIvIm CoDE art. 552 (1870).
11. "In case the owner or his lessee does interfere and injures the usufructuary
in his rights, '. . . he (the owner or his assignees) shall be bound to make good
the losses and damages which may result.' Article 601, Civil Code." Gueno v.
Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 1102, 117 So.2d 817, 824 (1960).
12. 240 La. 198, 121 So.2d 831 (1960).
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and the petroleum company sold 40 acres in the tract to J. A.
Hodges by warranty deed, reserving to the petroleum company
all the minerals to be produced on the land. During 1938, the
California Company, under a lease which did not cover the 40
acres, drilled two wells on the tract covered by the 1931 servi-
tude but not on the land which had been sold to Hodges. Both
wells were dry, but it was not disputed that the drilling was of
a nature to interrupt the running of 10 years liberative prescrip-
tion. In 1946, the petroleum company leased part of the land
subject to the 1931 servitude to Barnsdall Oil Company. Again,
the 40 acres belonging to Hodges was not embraced by the lease.
Two wells were drilled by Barnsdall in 1946 and 1947, and they
have produced continuously since completion.
After Hodges had owned the land for more than 10 years,
he wrote the petroleum company asking for a release of the
mineral rights. His request was denied on the grounds that the
good faith drilling of contiguous lands in 1939 had interrupted
prescription on all the land covered by the 1931 servitude and,
further, that production in 1946 had preserved the petroleum
company's mineral interest. Hodges filed the instant suit for
a declaratory judgment. Hodges appealed from an adverse de-
cision in the lower court.
The Supreme Court, on original hearing, held that since the
petroleum company had warranted the title against any pre-
existing charges upon the land and had not excepted the 1931
servitude from the warranty, it was estopped to assert any
claim under that servitude. Defendant argued that no grounds
for estoppel existed because the minerals were not conveyed
(due to the reservation) and therefore could not have been the
subject of any warranty. This argument was rejected. "This
is immaterial to our decision . . . because the warranty which
is the basis of estoppel is the warranty of title to the land, and
not of the title to the mineral rights. '1 3 The court further held
that the petroleum company was now estopped from disputing
the fact that it was a vendor of the land.
On rehearing, the court limited the estoppel which had been
applied on original hearing. In the Tritico14 case, involving the
same type of warranty deed, the court held that the mineral
reservation in the deed did not create a new servitude because
13. 121 So.2d 831, 837 (La. 1960).
14. Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So.2d 782 (1949).
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the vendor petroleum company had not extinguished the 1931
servitude prior to the sale. In view of the Tritico decision and
the broad estoppel applied in the original opinion in the instant
case, defendant argued that it was put "in the position of having
lost both sides of the same question." 15 After conceding the
correctness of this contention, the court held that the estoppel
applied in the original hearing was too broad. Since plaintiff
had agreed to a mineral reservation in the deed, the court con-
cluded that the petroleum company would not have been estopped
from asserting the 1931 servitude during the 10 years following
the sale. However, after that period the petroleum company
was estopped from asserting the interruption of prescription
by drilling which had occurred on contiguous lands. The
rationale of the decision was that Hodges should not be placed
at a disadvantage because he had no notice that a mineral
servitude existed on the land at the time he bought. Likewise,
he should not be allowed to escape the existence of a charge
against the land during the 10 years following the sale because
he assented to a mineral reservation. By applying the doctrine
of limited estoppel, the court felt that an equitable solution was
reached.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
SALE
J. Denson Smith*
Some interesting and novel questions were presented to the
court in the case of Da~um v. Lehde.' Plaintiff was the purchaser
in a contract by which the defendant agreed to sell certain im-
proved real estate. Prior to the completion and delivery of the
act of sale the improvements were partially destroyed by fire. It
appears that the defendant rejected the plaintiff's demand that
he transfer the property to plaintiff together with his interest
in a fire insurance policy on the improvements. Plaintiff then
sued claiming alternatively (1) the delivery of the property in
substantially its condition before the fire; (2) the delivery of
the property in its damaged condition together with the sum re-
15. Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So.2d 831, 840 (La. 1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 239 La. 607, 119 So.2d 481 (1960).
